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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

LAREE HANSEN,

Case No. 20100522

Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Illegal Use/Possession of a Controlled
Substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), in the Second Judicial
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress
evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
"We review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. We review the
trial court's conclusions of law based on these facts under a correctness standard." State
v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992).
These issues were preserved by Ms. Hansen, who filed a motion to suppress
evidence which was subsequently denied by the trial court. R. 37, 29, 51.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. IV and XIV, Utah Const. Art. I §
14, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (2010).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 8, 2009, the State of Utah charged Laree C. Hansen ("Defendant",
"Appellant", "Ms. Hansen") with Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a Third
Degree Felony, with Possession of Marijuana and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, both
Class B misdemeanors, and Intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. Ms. Hansen entered a
home in which police were present. The owner of the home told officers that Ms. Hansen
was not welcome on the property. Officers asked her to leave, which she did. Upon
leaving, an officer questioned Ms. Hansen and subsequently arrested her for public
intoxication. On January 20, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. R.
2

37. A hearing on that motion was heard on February 25, 2010 and the court denied that
motion on that date. R. 51. On April 1, 2010, the defendant entered into a guilty plea
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) preserving the issue in the
motion for appeal. R. 53. The final judgment was entered on June 21, 2010. R. 63. On
June 21, 2010, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 64.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On September 7, 2009, at approximately 2 am, Officer Justin Gorman of the
Ogden Police Department was dispatched to an Ogden residence on a burglary in
progress. Dispatch informed the officer that the complainant, Robert Soto, said he was
hiding in his grandmother's bathroom and that two unknown males were trying to kick
down the bathroom door.
When Officer Gorman arrived at the scene, he inspected the house and found no
sign of forced entry. He also was unable to hear any activity in the house. Another officer
arrived, and together they knocked on the door. Irene Chavez, the homeowner, answered
the door. Asking the police why they were there, she told police that "nothing is going
on" and that her grandson, Robert, was upstairs taking a shower. Officers told her about
the call and Ms. Chavez invited them upstairs, where they encountered Robert, wearing a
towel around his waist.

At no point did the trial court take direct evidence about the facts of the case. The
parties stipulated to the facts as stated in the police report. R. 49:3. This summary of the
facts will be taken from the police report. See Police Report, Addendum A.
3

According to Robert, he was in the shower and thought that Irene had gone to bed.
He heard noises outside of the bathroom, called for Irene and when she failed to answer,
he became scared because "of all the gang stuff that been going on." Robert seemed
"very strange", the officer said, and paced pack and forth as he spoke with the officers.
Irene informed the officers that she had never gone to bed and Robert had probably heard
her.
At this point, the officer heard knocking on the back door. He went to the door and
saw a female looking through the glass door. He opened the door and the woman began
walking around the deck "in small jerky steps." She held a black purse tightly to her body
and "kept looking around jerking her head back and forth." She identified herself to
Officer Gorman as Laree Hansen and stated she was there to see Robert. The officer had
her sit down, where she "kept squirming around on the bench and could not sit still." The
officer felt like she "appeared to be acting like someone under the influence of meth."
The officer asked her if she had used drugs recently and Laree denied it. He asked
her if she was high and she said that she was not. When the officer asked her if she had
drugs in her purse, she stood up and walked toward the door. Irene, the homeowner,
yelled from inside the house, "I don't want her anywhere around my house." Laree
pushed past the officer and went to an upstairs bedroom. The officer watched her put her
purse under the bed, then stand up. Irene was yelling behind the officer to get Laree out
of her home. The officer told Laree to get her purse.

4

Irene told the officer that she did not want to pursue criminal charges—only that
she wanted her out of the home. The officers escorted Laree out of the home, at which
point Officer Gorman noticed "that she was swaying and couldn't seem to walk straight."
Once outside I asked Laree if she had used METH today and she said admitted she
had. Based on Laree's actions and her admission of being under the influence of
METH I placed Laree under arrest for Public Intoxication for being a danger to
herself and others.
The officer searched Laree incident to arrest and found a meth pipe,
methamphetamine and marijuana, which were the basis for the charges at issue in this
case.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the trial court denied the
motion, stating:
THE COURT: Your motion to suppress is denied. Let me explain my reasons. I
guess I just fundamentally disagree with the notion that just because the
homeowner doesn't want to press charges for disturbing the peace that occurred
outside, or the trespass that occurred inside the home; the officer is aware of those
things. Those are distinct violations of law, and the fact that the homeowner
doesn't want to press charges doesn't change the fact that those events occurred,
and that they occurred under a situation where your client was swaying and unable
to walk straight, could every easily be a danger to herself.
I think that under all of these circumstances, there was probable cause and for that
reason, the motion is denied.
R. 51:15-16.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When the officer arrested Ms. Hansen, he stated he did so because she was
publicly intoxicated. The law of this state requires that to arrest someone for public
5

intoxication, the officer must be able to point to specific facts which demonstrate that the
person was a danger to herself or to others—the mere fact that a person is intoxicated in
public is not a sufficient basis for an arrest. None of the facts in this case point to a fact
that Ms. Hansen was a danger to herself or to others. Additionally, officers lacked
probable cause to arrest for private intoxication because Ms. Hansen did not
unreasonably disturb others. Finally, the officer lacked a sufficient basis to arrest Ms.
Hansen for trespass because the homeowner, Irene, subsequently revoked any trespassory
interest when she asked officers not to charge Ms. Hansen with trespass. In addition, the
officer did not see a basis at the time to arrest for trespass, which justifies a factual
conclusion that the elements for trespass were not met under the circumstances.
ARGUMENT
I»

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEUSLY FAILED TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE OFFICER
LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECTUATE AN ARREST FOR
PUBLIC INTOXICATION OR TRESPASS
A, The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution and Article I § 14 of the
Utah Constitution Require a Police Officer to Have Probable Cause
Before Effectuating an Arrest
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article

I § 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated." The Courts on both the state and federal
levels have defined when a seizure is unreasonable.

6

The Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) held:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court
defined its long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court
defined these levels as follows:
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to noncoercive questioning by an officer. Since the encounter is consensual, and
the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a Fourth
Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather, when "specific
and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable
suspicion a person has or is committing a crime," an officer may initiate an
investigative detention without consent.
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been "characterized
[as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause."
A level three encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, an officer must have probable cause before the officer can effect a
warrantless arrest. "The [United States] Constitution permits an officer to arrest a
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed or is committing an offense." DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36. ...
The United States Supreme Court defined probable cause justifying an
arrest as "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient
7

to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense." DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37; see also Gerstein v. Push, 420
U.S. 103, 111, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 85 S. Ct. 223, 3 Ohio Misc. 71, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 80 (1964);
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76. Similarly, this court explained that in Utah the
determination of whether the police had probable cause to arrest someone without
a warrant "'should be made on an objective standard: whether from the facts
known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a
reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in
believing that the suspect had committed the offense.'" State v. Cole, 674 P.2d
119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d
1259, 1260 (1972)); see also State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232-33 (Utah
1996).
A law enforcement officer has probable cause whenever the crime is
committed in the presence of that officer because the observing officer knows of
sufficient facts to believe that the suspect committed the crime alleged. ...
State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,fflf26-28, 57 P.3d 1052.
When the police arrested Ms. Hansen, they escalated the encounter to levelthree, which means that the arrest had to be justified by probable cause. IdL The question
that is at issue is whether the police officer had probable cause to even stop Defendant for
intoxication and arrest her. Under Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160
L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as it is
made with probable cause. Id. at 152.
Here, the Defendant's encounter with the police officers quickly escalated to a
level three encounter once the officers decided to arrest the Defendant. The search
incident to arrest was a continuation of that level three encounter. Under both federal and
state constitutional law, the police must have "probable cause" that an offense occurred.
The United States Supreme Court has defined probable cause justifying an arrest as "facts
8

and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). In the present case, there was no offense, and
therefore no probable cause.
B. The Intoxication Statute Requires That An Officer Be Able to Point to
Specific Instances of Conduct Which Show That the Person "May Endanger"
Herself or Others in a Public Place or That She Unreasonably Disturbed Others in a
Private Place,
The criminal offense of intoxication is found in section 76-9-701. Subsection one
reads:
A person is guilty of intoxication if the person is under the influence of alcohol, a
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic
vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger the person or another, in a public
place or in a private place where the person unreasonably disturbs other persons.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (2009).
Defendant is aware of three cases that have addressed the meaning of this statute.
In State v. Trane, the Supreme Court found probable cause for police officers to
effectuate an arrest for public intoxication. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d 1052. In
Trane, police were dispatched on a complaint that a man was harassing customers at a
convenience store. Id. at ^ 2. The officer approached the defendant, who was standing by
a pay phone, and smelled alcohol on his breath. Id.fflf3-4. The defendant was loud, used
profanity and engaged in "tumultuous-type" behavior. Id at Tf 4. He used his arms as he
talked, puffed out his chest and took a defensive boxing stance toward the officer. Id.
9

Another officer approached and decided to frisk the defendant for weapons. Id. at f 7.
When he approached the defendant, he noticed that Trane had slurred speech, the
"appearance of one who was intoxicated" and that he smelled of alcohol. Id. The
defendant refused to comply with the officer's request to frisk him. Id at f 8. As the
officer cuffed the defendant, he forcibly resisted the officer. Id at ff 8-9.
The Supreme Court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for
public intoxication:
In this case, the officers had probable cause and statutory authorization to
arrest Trane for intoxication because Trane committed the offense in the presence
of the officers. Both officers heard the call from dispatch that a man was harassing
or disturbing customers at a convenience store. ... Trane was in a public place: he
was outside the convenience store near a bank of public telephones.
As the officers approached Trane, they each individually and independently
noticed that Trane smelled of alcohol and exhibited signs of intoxication. For
example, Bushman noticed that Trane was ffloudff and behaving in a "tumultuoustype" manner. Dobrowolski noticed Trane was swaying, Trane's speech was
slurred, and Trane appeared intoxicated.
The officers also noticed that Trane was intoxicated enough to potentially
pose a danger to himself and others. The officers feared for their safety,
recognizing from past experiences with intoxicated individuals that they could
become violent. In this case, Trane was angry, was uncooperative, had "puffed his
chest out [and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer," and initially would not
release his identification card upon Bushman's request. Under such circumstances,
the officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for intoxication.
Id at ^ 38-40.
The significance of Trane in regards to the matter at hand is that at no point did
Ms. Hansen behave in a violent or dangerous manner like the defendant did in Trane. It
was critical to the court's analysis in Trane that the defendant acted in a "tumultuous5'
10

manner in a public place. He was intoxicated enough, the court said, that he "potentially
pose[d] a danger to himself and others." Id. at % 40. Yet, in this case, Ms. Hansen's only
violation was that she was swaying and couldn't walk straight.
Perhaps the most thorough analysis of this statute was made by the Supreme Court
in 2008. In Due South, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control 2008 UT 71, 197
P.3d 82, the Supreme Court analyzed in depth the meaning of the intoxication statute at
issue in this case.
First, the Court looked to the meaning of the phrase, "may endanger" in the statute.
According to the Court, this element requires "proof of a reasonable likelihood of harm
based on the circumstances." IdL at ^j 26. A "speculative possibility of harm" according to
the Court, "is not sufficient." IdL According to the Court, there were two reasons why
allowing a speculative possibility of harm would eviscerate the endangerment
requirement of the statute. First, "an officer could always conceive of some speculative
source of endangerment." Id. at ^ 27. The court cited several "stock conclusions" in
intoxication cases where officers could speculate about harm: "'unsteadiness, from
falling, or from exercising diminished judgment due to the alcohol' or that the patron
could 'endanger himself or another if he were to drive a motor vehicle.' Id. These "stock
conclusion^] [were] applied to every patron regardless of his particular circumstances.
Moreover, it could be applied to all persons exhibiting signs of intoxication regardless oi
whether they actually posed a risk of endangerment. Thus, accepting a speculative
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possibility of harm would effectively eliminate the endangerment requirement from the
public intoxication standard." Id
Second, the Court said, allowing speculative harms would conflate any person
whose blood alcohol limit is over .08 to an intoxication case, since a person over that
legal limit cannot safely operate a motor vehicle. Id. at ^f 28. This, however, was not the
Legislature's intent since it failed to reference the two statutes. "Thus, in order for the
endangerment requirement to have any meaning, there must be a reasonable likelihood ol
endangerment based on the particular circumstances, rather than a speculative possibility
of endangerment." Id
Requiring a circumstantial analysis of endangerment is consistent with the
approach taken by states with similar statutes. For example, the Texas public
intoxication statute employs the same may endanger requirement as Utah's public
intoxication statute. In applying the endangerment requirement, the Texas Court oi
Appeals stated that "physical manifestations of alcoholic consumption," such as
slurred speech, blood shot eyes, and a smell of alcohol on the breath are "not
sufficient to constitute public intoxication." "Rather, the State must demonstrate
proof of potential danger either to the appellant himself or to others." The proof of
potential danger requirement has been met in cases where the individual was
walking down the middle of a street, buying tire chains and indicating an intent to
drive, arguing in the middle of the street and resisting arrest, and sleeping in a car
in front of a lounge, presenting the likelihood that the individual would wake up
and drive home. But it was not met where the individual was in a private driveway
leaning on the back of a vehicle.
Id at ^f 29 (internal citations omitted).
The Supreme Court then cited Trane as support for the proposition that "in
determining whether there was probable cause to believe that Trane was violating the
public intoxication statute, we looked for actual evidence of endangerment based on the
circumstances." Id. at f 30 (emphasis added). The Court concluded, "in order to satisfy
12

the may endanger element of the public intoxication statute, an officer must be able to
articulate objective facts indicating a reasonable likelihood of endangerment based on the
particular circumstances." Id. atf 31.
In addition, the Supreme Court analyzed the public and private distinction in the
statute, finding that there were two different types of intoxication under the statute.
"Under the public intoxication statute, an individual is "guilty of intoxication" in a public
place if he is "under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that [he] may endanger
himself or another." And he is "guilty of intoxication" in a private place if he is "under
the influence of alcohol... to a degree that [he]... unreasonably disturbs other persons.9'
Id at 133.
The final Utah case to address the public intoxication statute came out of this
court. State v. Henderson, 2007 UT App 125, 159 P.3d 397. In Henderson, officers were
dispatched to the scene of a fight. Id. at 1 2. When they arrived, they noticed the
defendant walking in a parking lot. Id They approached him and asked him what he was
doing. Id He responded that he "didn't do shit." Id The officers noticed he had glassy
eyes, slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet. Id at 13. The officers asked the
defendant to remove his hands from his pocket. Id. The defendant did not comply and
began to walk away. Id at 1 4. Officers subdued him and subsequently found cocaine in
his pocket. Id He challenged the officer's probable cause to arrest him for intoxication.
Id. at 15.
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On appeal, this Court analyzed the public and private place distinction in the
statute and determined that the "unreasonably disturbs other persons" language of the
statute only existed if a person was in a private place.
In considering the plain language of the intoxication statute, we conclude that the
phrase "where he unreasonably disturbs other persons" modifies only the
immediate preceding phrase "in a private place." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1).
The legislature specifically distinguished between private and public places. If it
intended for the "unreasonably disturbs other persons" element to be part of an
intoxication offense regardless of the location, there would be no reason to
individually list "private place" and "public place." Id. Because we assume that
the legislature used each term advisedly, see Carrier, 2004 UT 98 at % 30, 104 P.3d
1208, we conclude that Henderson is guilty of intoxication if he is "under the
influence of alcohol... to a degree that [he] may endanger himself or another, in a
public place."
IdL at f 11. In other words, according to this court, a person may commit two types ol
intoxication: 1) she is under the influence of alcohol to a degree that she may endanger
herself or another in a public place; or 2) she is under the influence of alcohol in a private
place if she unreasonably disturbs other persons.2

2

However, the Utah Supreme Court, in Trane, quoted the first scenario from the statute
(the public place intoxication) as follows: "A person commits the crime of public
intoxication under the Utah Code when that person 'is under the influence of alcohol. ..
to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a public place . . . where
he unreasonably disturbs other persons.'" State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97,137, 57 P.3d
1052. This quotation supports a reading that the public place component of the public
intoxication statute requires the person to unreasonably disturb others. In Henderson, this
court, in a footnote, dismissed that argument. "The issue in Trane was whether there was
probable cause to believe that the defendant had endangered himself or another. See id.
Because the narrow question of statutory construction presented here was not at issue in
Trane, the misplaced second ellipsis does not govern the outcome in this case."
Henderson, 2007 UT App 125 atf 11, n. 1.
14

Under the first scenario, the public place scenario, the State must be able to show,
1) that the person was under the influence of alcohol or a drug, 2) they must point to
specific, objective facts which show "actual evidence of endangerment" based on the
particular circumstances and 3) that it happened in a public place. Under the second
scenario, the private place scenario, the State must be able to show, 1) that the person was
under the influence of alcohol or a drug, 2) to a degree that she unreasonably disturbed
other persons and 3) that it occurred in a private place.
In Henderson, this court found the police had probable cause to arrest for
intoxication in a public place. The defendant was stumbling and refused to comply with
the officers' orders. Id at ^f 13. He had glassy eyes, slurred speech and was unsteady on
his feet. Id. This court emphasized, however, that "being intoxicated in public does not
establish all the elements of the intoxication offense . . . " I d This court analyzed the case
in terms of whether Henderson "may" have endangered himself and emphasized the
following facts: the defendant was "intoxicated, alone, uncooperative, and walking
toward a busy street." Id. These facts, the court believed, justified a finding that the
defendant could be arrested for public intoxication. Id.
A few cases from other states are instructive on the issues at hand.
In State v. Hawkins, 923 So.2d 763 (La. App. 2006), the Court of Appeal oi
Louisiana found that officers lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest for public
intoxication. Officers observed the defendant swaying and staggering. Id. at 764. When
they approached her, they smelled alcohol on her breath. Id As they tried to talk with her,
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she attempted to walk away and fell down. Id In analyzing the case, the court held that
"mere intoxication, is not enough to justify an arrest for public intoxication, unless the
subjects were either a danger to themselves or others, or would disturb the peace." Id at
769. It found that "Ms. Hawkins' actions of merely walking down the street in an
intoxicated condition, without more, is insufficient to establish that the defendant posed a
danger to herself, others, or a disturbance to the public so as to justify a lawful arrest." Id,
In a Texas case, the court found a lack of probable cause to arrest for intoxication.
Britton v. Texas, 578 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In that case, the defendant was
a passenger in a car. His head was bobbing and weaving. Id. at 686. His eyes were glassy
and bloodshot and he mumbled incoherently when asked questions. Id at 687. The officer
arrested him for public intoxication. "It is clear from the officer's testimony that given the
facts observed by him, he lacked the probable cause to arrest appellant for the offense of
public intoxication. No facts or information was provided by the police officer to indicate
any basis for a reasonable inference that the appellant's suspected intoxication was to a
degree that would endanger himself or others." Id
Several general principles must be established at this point. First, a person cannot
be guilty for merely being intoxicated or under the influence in a public place. The state
must point to specific facts which justify actual evidence that the person was a danger to
herself or to others. Drunkenness, swaying, bobbing heads, incomprehensible speech,
falling down and other similar behaviors are not sufficient by themselves to create a
justification to arrest. If in a public place, the officer must be able to point to specific
16

facts (other than these) to show that the person posed a danger to himself or others. In the
private place, the officer must show that the person unreasonably disturbed others.
C. In This Case, Officers Lacked Probable Cause to Effectuate an Arrest for
Public Intoxication,
The officer had the following facts at his disposal when he arrested Ms. Hansen.
She knocked on the back door. As the officer spoke to her, she jerked her head around
and had difficulty sitting still. She denied using drugs, but pushed past the officer into the
home and put a purse under the bed. Irene, the homeowner, told officers to get her out of
the house. Officers asked Ms. Hansen to leave and she complied. As officers were
escorting Ms. Hansen out of the house, the officer noticed that she swayed and could not
walk straight. At this point, the officer asked her if she had used meth and she admitted
that she had. "Based on Laree's actions and her admission for being under the influence
of METH I placed Laree under arrest for Public Intoxication for being a danger to herself
and others."
In the officer's own words, his reason for arresting Ms. Hansen was based on two
factors: 1) her behavior: swaying, fidgeting, jerking her head, not sitting still and 2) her
admission to using methamphetamine. Unfortunately, neither of these facts combined
constitute probable cause to make an arrest for intoxication.
Assuming the officer was making an arrest for public intoxication, he must show
that the person is under the influence of alcohol or a drug. Fidgety behavior, jerking the
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head and an inability to sit still may certainly be factors in determining drug use, but they
are a far cry from probable cause that the person has used drugs. Several innocuous
reasons may create this type of behavior: the person might have ADHD. The person
might be upset or on edge. The person might be anxious to talk with someone. All of
these scenarios might reproduce the exact behavior the officer witnessed, yet do not
indicate drug use. It might be reasonable suspicion that the person has used drugs, but in
order to rise to the level of probable cause, the officer must be able to point to "facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). The officer would have to have a legitimate basis to
believe based on these facts alone, that Ms. Hansen was under the influence of drugs.
Other facts might certainly have helped this situation rise to the level of probable
cause. For instance, if the officer was able to smell the distinct odor of a controlled
substance, or if the defendant dropped a drug pipe, he would clearly have probable cause
that Ms. Hansen was engaging in drug use. However, at no point did the officer have any
concrete facts which were indicative of drug use, other than behavior, which could easily
have been caused by a myriad of innocent explanations.
Additionally, in a public intoxication case, the officer would need to have probable
cause that Ms. Hansen was going to endanger herself or others. As the Utah Supreme
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Court and this Court have made clear, intoxication, by itself, is not a sufficient basis to
make an arrest. Due South, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control 2008 UT 71, 197
P.3d 82; State v. Henderson, 2007 UT App 125, f 13, 159 P.3d 397. The Supreme Court
said

that

unsteadiness,

falling

down,

diminished

judgment,

slurred

speech,

glassy/bloodshot eyes, and the odor of alcohol are not sufficient to arrest someone for
public intoxication. Due South, 2008 UT atfflf27, 29. Rather, "an officer must be able to
articulate objective facts indicating a reasonable likelihood of endangerment based on the
particular circumstances." Id. at ^[31.
At no point did Ms. Hansen do anything that would endanger herself or others.
Unlike Trane or Henderson, she was cooperative with the police. She never turned
violent or refused to comply with the orders of police officers. She never threatened a
person. At one point, she did walk past the officer into the house and put her purse under
the bed. While this might have been odd, it certainly was not dangerous or violent
behavior. As the Supreme Court cited, courts have found dangerousness when a person
walked in the middle of the street, arguing in the middle of the street, and fought or
resisted. The classic situations are those in which people, because of their intoxicated
state, begin to do things that will cause them or others harm. One case, for example, the
defendant, in an inebriated state, walked near a water pier and could have fallen into the
ocean. This, the court concluded, constituted a serious danger to himself and constituted a
basis to arrest for endangerment. State v. Cambrice, 884 So.2d 628 (La. App. 2004).
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Another example would be an intoxicated person who starts yelling at and swinging fists
at passers by. The person is clearly a danger to others and needs to be arrested.
However, in Ms. Hansen's case, nothing she did constituted a danger to herself or
to others. She did not wander off in a place where she could have hurt herself. She, at no
point, threatened or engaged in violent behavior. As such, the State was unable to present
sufficient evidence that she constituted a danger to herself or to others. In other words, the
officer lacked probable cause to arrest Ms. Hansen for public intoxication absent the
endangerment element.
The State could argue that this case was a private intoxication case, as opposed to
a public intoxication case because it occurred largely on private property—in the home of
Irene. However, this does not appear to be the basis for the officer's arrest. In his own
words, he stated that he arrested Ms. Hansen because she was "a danger to herself and
others." This element falls under the public intoxication portion of the statute and not the
private intoxication element. The officer clearly manifested an intent to arrest her for
public intoxication. However, even if this were a private intoxication case, two problems
still exist. First, no evidence was presented to support a justification that Ms. Hansen was
even intoxicated. See Argument, pp. 17-18, infra. Second, no evidence was presented to
justify a conclusion that Ms. Hansen unreasonably disturbed others in a private place.
Offiers responded to a disturbance at Irene's home and it is clear that Ms. Hansen was not
involved in that disturbance. Robert, upstairs taking a shower, seemed to be just as
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suspicious to officers: pacing and acting "very strange." Ms. Hansen knocked on the door
and at no point yelled or made noise. Irene yelled to officers that she did not want Laree
in her house. At one point, Laree entered the home and Irene yelled at the officer to get
her out. The officer escorted Laree out of the house. As he was doing this, Irene told him
that "she didn't want to pursue criminal charges against Laree and only wanted Laree out
of her house." This hardly seems like an unreasonable disturbance. Clearly, Ms. Hansen
created a bit of a disturbance at the home, but this was not unreasonable, given that Irene
told the officer that she did not want Laree arrested. This latter fact is highly relevant to
showing the level of the disturbance: if it constituted an unreasonable disturbance, then
the home's occupant would certainly want the person arrested. It shows Irene's state of
mind—that she was not highly disturbed by this action.
However, even if this were an unreasonable disturbance, the officer would still
have to have probable cause that the defendant's intoxication led her to commit the
unreasonable disturbance. Again, no evidence was presented which would justify a
conclusion that Ms. Hansen was intoxicated. So it would be incongruous to state that this
evidence supports a conclusion that her intoxication caused her to commit an
unreasonable disturbance. As the Supreme Court said, a person is "'guilty of intoxication'
in a private place if he is 'under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that [he] . . .
unreasonably disturbs other persons.'" Due South, 2008 UT 71 at ^ 33 (emphasis added).
The State must have some evidence that supports a conclusion that Ms. Hansen's
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intoxication (or highness on drugs) caused her to unreasonably disturb other persons. The
evidence to this element is entirely lacking.
D. The Officer Also Lacked a Basis to Arrest for Trespass
Finally, the State may argue, like the trial court, that because Ms. Hansen
trespassed in the house, the officer may arrest her for that basis and may entirely disregard
the intoxication. This reasoning again ignores the officer's stated purpose for the arrest.
He indicated that he was arresting her for public intoxication and not for trespass. While
an officer's state of mind is not relevant in determining whether probable cause exists,
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), the fact remains that the officer did not see a
factual basis at the time to arrest her for trespass or he certainly would have arrested her
for it. Additionally, Irene also did not see a basis, because she told the officer that she only
wanted Laree to leave the house, but not to have her arrested. It appears, from the
evidence, that Ms. Hansen was not trespassing, but that she had been invited into the
home. She told the officer that she and Robert had smoked together a few hours
previously inside the home. Irene knew Laree and it is clear that she had been in the house
previously—she was able to navigate herself directly to the bedroom where she allegedly
smoked the controlled substance. When she entered the house, Irene asked the officer to
escort Laree out of the house.
This manifests a different sort of intent than trespass. If Irene thought that Laree
was trespassing, she certainly would have asked the officer to arrest her. However, it
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seems more likely from the evidence, that Irene merely wanted Laree to leave. Once Laree
entered the home, Irene asked her to leave, and Laree complied.
However, Irene did state to the officer that "I don't want her anywhere around my
house" prior to Laree's entrance and Laree subsequently entered the residence. This seems
to fit within the definition of trespass. According to the statute,
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...:
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to
any property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another;
(b) knowing the person's entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or
remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone
with apparent authority to act for the owner; ...
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (2010). There is no question that Ms. Hansen did not manifest
the intent to commit any of the trespass offenses outlined in subsection (a). None of the
facts show that Ms. Hansen intended to annoy, injure, cause damage or to commit a crime.
However, when Irene stated that she did not want Laree "anywhere around my house" and
Ms. Hansen subsequently entered, her conduct appears to constitute a trespass.
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Yet this is not entirely the case. Irene subsequently revoked any sort of trespassory
interest when she told the officer that she did not want to pursue charges against Ms.
Hansen. Trespass is the sort of offense, at least in subsection (b), which depends entirely
on the intent of the owner of the property. See e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
162 (1966) (Black, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, dissenting) ("There is a long history behind
trespass laws in the United States. Invasion of another man's property over his protest is
one of the surest ways any person can pick out to disturb the peace.") (emphasis added);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984) ("The law of trespass recognizes
the interest in possession and control of one's property and for that reason permits
exclusion of unwanted intruders. ... In any event, unlicensed use of property by others is
presumptively unjustified, as anyone who wishes to use the property is free to bargain for
the right to do so with the property owner.") (emphasis added). For example, suppose
Bob tells Mary that she is not allowed on his property. Mary enters and Bob sees her and
decides to allow her into the house. While her initial entry might have been trespassory,
Bob's revocation of his privacy interest no longer makes Mary's presence a trespass.
This case is somewhat different than the scenario given above because Irene never
allowed Laree to be on her property. However, if an owner tells the police that she does
not want a person charged for trespass, then she has communicated her intent to revoke
her trespassory interest in the property. This is the type of offense where the owner's
intent becomes critical and it is probably exactly because of Irene's representations to the
officer that he decided to not arrest Laree for trespass. What is clear from the common24

law of trespass is the owner's consent. In order to commit a trespass a "person has
actually invaded the possessor's exclusive interest of land without the possessor's
consent." Beuckens, Molly Jane. Casenote: H.E. Stevenson v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours
and Co.: Determing that Property Owners Can Recover for Trespass Based on
Contamination by Emission of Airborne Particulates, 8 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 26
(2003). The law is clear that if the owner subsequently revokes his trespassory interest,
then a trespass no longer exists. While Ms. Hansen might have trespassed when she
initially entered the home, Irene subsequently obviated that offense by informing the
officer that "she didn't want to pursue criminal charges against Laree and only wanted
Laree out of her house."
Ms. Hansen contends that when Irene told officers not to arrest her, she was, in
fact, revoking her desire to allege a trespass which would have prohibited the officer from
making an arrest based on trespass. This seems to be clear from the record as both Irene
and the officer failed to pursue this avenue. In fact, the officer chose an entirely different
basis upon which to arrest her, public intoxication. He certainly would have arrested her
for trespass if he believed he had a basis to do so.
In addition, under landlord-tenant law, the tenant, and not the landlord, determines
whether the person may enter the premises. "[P]ersons who enter a building with the
permission of a tenant cannot be deemed a trespasser, even if they have been forbidden
from entering by the landlord." Goldstein, Elena, Kept Out: Responding to Public
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Housing No-Trespass Policies, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 215, 221 (Wint. 2003).
Arguably, Ms. Hansen had permission from Robert to enter the premises, since she had
been staying with him earlier in the day. While the record is not clear as to whether
Robert was a tenant of Irene's, Ms. Hansen seems to have believed that she had a right to
enter Robert's room and Irene's revocation of consent would not operate to prohibit
Laree's access to Robert's room.
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally impermissible
seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this constitutional violation
affect the evidence that was found during the search incident to arrest. In the case of
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
"[t]he exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion."
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In
State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) this Court held:
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to exclude
'all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution.' Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. There is no dispute
that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was
unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute that, absent the good faith
exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
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Since the Defendant did not violate the law, the officers did not have probable
cause to arrest her. The contraband, which was found during the subsequent search
incident to arrest, should be suppressed by the trial court. For these reasons, the
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to suppress the evidence that was found during
said search.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to
suppress all evidence obtained after the Defendant was unconstitutionally seized.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 7

day of ^ m ^ f f * ^ , 2010.

P. NEWTON
r the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Police Report

OGDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY
GO OG 2009-70165 (CLOSED/ARRES)

3572 - 0 DRUG-AMPHETAMINE POSSESS

(Case Specific Information)

Linkage factors
Resident status: Resident

Related text page(s)
Document: INITIAL R/O FIELD
Author: 846 - Gorman,G Justin
Related date/time: Sep-07-2009 0403
On 09-07-2009 at 0149 hours Officer Froerer and I were dispatched on a
burglary in progress complaint at 627 Canyon View DR.
The complainant, Robert Soto, reported to Dispatch that he was hiding in
the bathroom of his grandmother's house because he believed there was
someone inside the house. Robert kept hanging up and calling Dispatch
back, reporting that he now saw 2 unknown males inside the residence trying
to kick in the bathroom door to get inside.
Robert also said his grandmother is somewhere in the house and that she was
the one who told him to lock himself in the bathroom.
I arrived checking around the residence finding all of the doors locked and
all of the windows secured. No sign of forced entry was observed. I tried
For: JOCHOA Tuesday September 8,2009
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OGDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY
GO OG 2009-70165 (CLOSED/ARRES)

3572 - 0 DRUG-AMPHETAMINE POSSESS

to listen inside but I could not hear any noise inside. When Officer
Froerer arrived I knocked on the front door and it was answered immediately
by the home owner, Irene Chavez.
Irene was startled when she saw us at the door and asked what was wrong. I
asked Irene what was going on inside the home and she told me "nothing is
going on, why are you guys here".
I explained the situation to Irene and she told me that her grandson,
Robert, was upstairs taking a shower. Irene invited us inside and escorted
us upstairs where a male individual exited an upstairs bathroom wearing a
towel around his waist.
The male stated his name was Robert Soto and he began explaining what had
happened. Robert said he was in the bathroom and thought Irene had gone to
sleep for the night. Robert stated he heard some noises outside the
bathroom door so he called for Irene but he didn't hear her answer him.
Robert stated he started getting scared because of "all the gang stuff that
been going on" and thought they were after him.
Robert seemed very strange and kept pacing back and forth as he talked. I
asked Robert if he was in a gang or on drugs and he said no. Irene told me
that she never went to sleep and was up walking around the house which was
what Robert had heard.
As I was speaking to Robert and Irene someone started banging loudly on the
back patio door which scared Irene. Irene stated she thinks someone was
really trying to break in now.
I went to the back door and observed a female individual peering ina^fire . j\
through the glass door. I opened the door and the female stepM^fcack^OaS*
began walking around the small deck in quick jerky steps. &&&exntt& was
clutching a small black purse tightly to her body and keptr-lookiiift aroaj^l \
jerking her head back and forth.
ft\• \\\T G \ e ^
>J?^
I asked the female what she was doing and she saijdkw]
Robert. I asked the female to sit down on a bfi^wi tjiat wagfbdhytfe^^TO&^and
asked her for her name. The female stated hfi^nam^Va^N^^e/^E^M^jPwith a

BOB * 07-.1-...

VV^^

Laree kept squirming around on the bench and coulcj,
ill. Based on
Laree 1 s movements and behavior, I observed that '^jfer apg^ared to be acting
like someone under the influence of METH.
\<Cr
I asked Laree when the last time she used drugs
while ago. I asked Laree what drugs she was on
she wasn't on any drugs. I asked Laree if she
and Laree immediately stood up off of the bench
the door.

was and she said it was a
right now and she stated
had any drugs in her purse
and started walking towards

Irene apparently recognized Laree and yelled from inside the house "I don't
want her anywhere around my house". I asked Laree to sit back down but she
pushed past me and ran into the house heading inside to one of the upstairs
bedrooms. I followed Laree inside the bedroom and I watched as Laree place
her purse underneath the bed, then she stood up and acted like everything
was normal.

For: JOCHOA Tuesday September 8,2009
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GO OG 2009-70165 (CLOSED/ARRES)

3572 - 0 DRUG-AMPHETAMINE POSSESS

Irene was yelling from behind me for Laree to get out of her house so I
told Laree to get her purse. Laree picked up her purse from under the bed.
Irene said she didn't want to pursue criminal charges against Laree and
only wanted Laree out of her house. Officer Froerer and I escorted Laree
outside. As Laree walked I noticed that she was swaying and couldn't seem
to walk straight.
Once outside I asked Laree if she had used METH today and she said admitted
she had. Based on Laree's actions and her admission of being under the
influence of METH I placed Laree under arrest for Public Intoxication for
being a danger to herself and others.
I searched Laree and her purse incident to arrest and inside Laree's purse
was a small black wallet sized case with a zipper on it. I opened the case
and found a discolored glass pipe with a bulb on the end of it that, based
on my training and experience as a Police Officer, appeared to be a pipe
commonly used to smoke METH with.
There was also a small plastic baggy that contained a white crystal
substance that appeared to be consistent with METH, and another plastic
baggy that contained a green leafy substance that looked and smelled
consistent with Marijuana.
Numerous small plastic baggies with white residue where also found inside
the case along with 3 small silver colored spoons that had a white residue
on them.
I transported Laree to the Weber County Jail where I read Laree her Miranda
Rights. Laree agreed to speak with me and told me that she and Robert
smoked METH together a couple of hours ago at Robert's house.
Laree told me the white crystal substance was METH and the green leafy
substance was Marijuana which were hers. Laree stated that she used the
glass pipe to smoke METH with.
I questioned Laree about where she obtained the drugs from but she would
not say,. Laree then changed her story and said that Robert is the one who
planted the.drugs.on her and that they belong to him.
I booked Laree into Jail for Public Intoxication, Possession of METH,
Possession of Marijuana, and. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
I booked the black case, the glass pipe, the plastic baggies, the spoons,
the white crystal substance, and the green leafy substance into Evidence.
The white crystal substance weighed approximately 0.4 grams and the green
leafy substance weighed approximately 1.5 grams.
I tested the crystal substance with a Narcotic Identification Kit (NIK)
which showed a positive result for METH.
All related paperwork was turned into F^f§ff^)M^°l f&f^P&F

clearance information
For: JOCHOA Tuesday September 8, 2009
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andUCA §77-38-6,'the victim(s)
and witnesses' identifying
information has been redacted
from the enclosed documents.
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ADDENDUM B

Intoxication Statute
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701

JTAh STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/ConsHtntton | Hoe/513 ; Senate , Search

THtlo/Chaptcr/Soction:

(GOTO)

Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 9 Offenses Against Public Order and Decency
Section 701 Intoxication - Release of arrested person or placement in detoxification center.
76-9-701. Intoxication -- Release of arrested person or placement in detoxification center.
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if the person is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled
substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person
may endanger the person or another, in a public place or in a private place where the person
unreasonably disturbs other persons.
(2) (a) A peace officer or a magistrate may release from custody a person arrested under this section
if the peace officer or magistrate believes imprisonment is unnecessary for the protection of the person
or another.
(b) A peace officer may take the arrested person to a detoxification center or other special facility as
an alternative to incarceration or release from custody.
(3) If a minor is found by a court to have violated this section and the violation is the minor's second
or subsequent violation of this section, the court:
(a) shall order the minor to participate in an educational series as defined in Section 41-6a-501; and
(b) may order the minor to participate in a screening as defined in Section 41-6a-501.
(4) (a) When a minor who is at least 18 years old, but younger than 21 years old, is found by a court
,0 have violated this section, the court hearing the case shall suspend the minor's driving privileges
inder Section 53-3-219.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirement in Subsection (4)(a), the court may reduce the suspension period
equired under Section 53-3-219 if:
(i) the violation is the minor's first violation of this section; and
(ii) the minor completes an educational series as defined in Section 41-6a-501.
(5) When a person who is at least 13 years old, but younger than 18 years old, is found by a court to
lave violated this section, the provisions regarding suspension of the driver's license under Section 78 A»-606 apply to the violation.
(6) When the court issues an order suspending a person's driving privileges for a violation of this
ection, the person's driver license shall be suspended under Section 53-3-219.
(7) An offense under this section is a class C misdemeanor.
.mended by Chapter 390,2009 General Session
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ADDENDUM C

Trespass Statute
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home I Site Map j Calendar 1 Code/Constitution { Hoyse f Seriate j Search

Title/Chapter/Section:

CGo T o J

Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property
Section 206 Criminal trespass.
76-6-206. Criminal trespass.
(1) As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary as
defined in Section 76-6-202,76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding
commercial obstruction:
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property, including the use
of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another;
(b) knowing the person's entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on property as to
which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for
the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(c) the person enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7).
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(c) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
(a) the property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; and
(b) the actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property.
Amended by Chapter 334,2010 General Session
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